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ORNAMENTAL DESIGN AND
INCREMENTAL INNOVATION
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA*

I. INTRODUCTION

"[F]orm follows function."'
"Any customer can have a car painted any color he wants, so long as it is
black. 2
The protection of esthetic product designs is the most intractable
issue in intellectual property law.3 For more than one-hundred years,
designers and academics have complained that the United States
provides inadequate incentives for commercial artistry.4 While sleek
styles undoubtedly add value to many consumer goods, most designs are
deemed part of the public domain and thus receive no legal protection

"Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. J.D., Yale Law School,
1998; B.A., Stanford University, 1995. Many thanks to Dan Cole and Kenny Crews for their
insights.
1. LoUis H. SULLIVAN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 258 (1956).
2. JAMES P. BARRY, HENRY FORD AND MASS PRODUCTION 55 (1973).
3. This Article uses "ornamental design," "product design," "commercial art," "esthetic
design," and "industrial design" interchangeably to describe styles that affect the appearance
of goods rather than their functional operation.
4. See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protectionfor IndustrialDesigns, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 887, 888-89; Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposalsfor
Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPs Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 531,
534-35 (1999); David Goldenberg, The Long and Winding Road: A History of the Fight Over
Industrial Design Protection in the United States, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 21, 21-23
(1997-1998).
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at all. Despite intense lobbying efforts that predate the first World
War, Congress has rejected every proposal to grant designs broad
property rights.
This steadfast resistance is puzzling. After all, during this same
period Congress gleefully handed out other new copyright, trademark,
and patent rights
Proponents of design protection have a simple
explanation for this disparate treatment. They claim that powerful
interest groups such as insurers and retailers block reform simply
because it would raise their costs.' Meanwhile, only poorly organized
consumers and researchers fight against the expansion of other
intellectual property rights. Design advocates insist, therefore, that
there is no principled basis for withholding protection from product
designs while granting generous privileges to ordinary creative works.9
This Article concludes that there are sound public policy reasons
against extending a property right to most commercial art and explores
other ways to promote design innovation.' ° Product designs occupy a
unique position in the law because they sit at the confluence of patent,
copyright, and trademark doctrine. Indeed, commercial art is the only
form of property that can be protected under -any of these three
traditional categories. Thus, the subject provides an ideal opportunity
to reexamine the bedrock principles of intellectual property and is the

5. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J.)
(setting forth the basic issues).
6. See generally Goldenberg, supra note 4 (providing a comprehensive history of
congressional debate on product design bills).
7. See, e.g., Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat.
2827-28 (increasing the copyright term by twenty years); Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (creating an expansive new remedy for owners of
famous trademarks); Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat.
3347 (establishing a property right for semiconductors); Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (extending copyright protection to a variety of new media); Trade-Marks
Registration and Protection Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 441
(granting extensive trademark rights under federal law).
8. See, e.g., Goldenberg, supra note 4, at 59-60. The motivation for this opposition is
pretty clear. Retailers are probably concerned that robust design protection will impose
costly due diligence obligations on them to weed out products that infringe on an existing
design. Meanwhile, insurers may worry that greater design property rights will increase costs
for replacement spare parts that they are often obligated to provide under their policies.
9. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 4, at 906-07 n.106; Hearings on S. 791 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 14 (1987) (testimony of Judge Giles Rich).
10. For other views on the ornamental design question, see, for example, Ralph S.
Brown, Design Protection:An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1987); Note, Protectionfor
the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1520 (1959).
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best starting point for developing a unified theory for intellectual

property law." Upon reviewing those tenets and their application in the
design context, the evidence is persuasive that the costs of a property
right outweigh the benefits. That judgment is reinforced by the
observation that, notwithstanding the lack of protection afforded to
commercial art, consumers already have an incredibly diverse selection
of product designs from which to choose.
Designs represent just one facet of a broader problem that the legal
system faces in encouraging incremental innovations in intellectual
property." Dynamic societies need small improvements and massive
breakthroughs in art and technology to prosper. Yet it is difficult to
develop incentives that can spur the less dramatic type of creativity
without imposing crippling costs. For instance, subtle innovations
usually generate small benefits that are exceeded even by the mere cost
of administering a property rule. 3 In addition, the margin of error for
protecting these improvements is slim because their life span is so short.
If copyrights are granted protection that runs six months beyond their
already lengthy optimal terms, any resulting distortion in incentives is
limited because the excessive protection would be small in percentage
terms.' Esthetic designs and other marginal improvements, by contrast,
11. Just as a single approach for analyzing real property eventually supplanted the
ancient division of property issues into different writs, so too has the time come to think
about developing one conceptual framework for intellectual property to replace the
traditional tripartite division of copyright, patent, and trademark. While some have started
down this path, see John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent,58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 119 (1991), much remains to be done. Since commercial art straddles all three
intellectual property categories, it provides a unique perspective on how those bodies of law
might fit together. Though some of the insights about designs found here are the foundation
for building such a unified approach, that task is beyond the scope of this Article.
12. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable
Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1997) (analyzing some of the issues raised by protecting
marginal improvements); see also J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 2432, 2531 (1994) ("[Rlegimes of exclusive
property rights seem better suited to organizing investment in relatively large-scale
innovation than in small-scale innovation ....).
13. A liability rule can also be used to protect a resource, but this generally involves
higher administrative costs than a property rule. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (distinguishing property and liability rules). That is so
because the value of the asset protected by a liability rule is indeterminate and can be
ascertained only by a jury or judge. Property rights, by contrast, are allocated through
voluntary transactions that require less state involvement. Accordingly, in my view the
arguments against using a property rule for ornamental designs apply a fortiori to using a
liability rule.
14. While people disagree about how much protection patents and copyrights should
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have an optimal term of only a matter of months. In other words, an
equivalent mistake that gives an additional six months of protection to
designs creates a much greater distortion in the incentives for
developing commercial art.
Evaluating the merits of a new design statute requires a careful
examination of whether product designs are a type of incremental
innovation that provides a benefit greater than the cost of granting a
property right. Three factors suggest that most designs do not meet this
test. First, a doctrinal analysis shows that commercial art resembles
trademarks more than copyrights or patents. 5 This is significant
because trademark is the one head of intellectual property that largely
rejects the goal of granting an entitlement to stimulate the production of
new resources.16 Second, in the Nineteenth Century there was a littleknown, but disastrous, experiment with extending a property rule over
incremental design improvements that gave excessive protection to
Finally, there are several pragmatic
functional inventions."
considerations that counsel against giving commercial art such a strong
entitlement.
Although a property rule is not a good choice for regulating designs,
an alternative is what will be termed throughout this Article as a
possessory rule. Possessory rules are different from property and
liability rules because they impose limits on the methods a copier may
use rather than on the right to copy itself. The best example of this is
trade secret doctrine, which permits the reverse engineering of
improvements while barring the use of industrial espionage or other
This gives
unsavory methods to obtain a competitor's secrets."
innovators a modest incentive by enhancing their ability to retain
exclusive possession of their work. Compared to a property right, a

receive, there is a consensus that their property rights should last for many years. Even
advocates of design reform, however, agree that protection for commercial art should end
much sooner. See, e.g., Frenkel, supra note 4, at 574.
15. See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent-The Dilemma of Confusion,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 289 (1999).
16. See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable:Dilution and Infringement in
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 980 (2001); Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast
Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2037,2057 (1993).

17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 250 (1998); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or
Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8
GEO. MASON L. REV. 69,78 (1999).
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possessory rule is cheaper for the state to administer and better at
reducing error costs because the decision of how much protection an
improvement deserves is left in the hands of the market.
Nevertheless, implementing a possessory rule in the design context is
difficult. The problem is that commercial art, unlike other forms of
marginal improvements, is easy to copy because it is obvious on the face
of a product. Simply prohibiting certain copying techniques, therefore,
is not going to help an innovator retain exclusive control of the work.
Only a broader formulation of possessory principles that stops some
people from copying designs altogether has a chance of being effective.
Expanding the possessory concept in, this manner, however, raises hard
questions that cannot be resolved without more information on design
piracy.
The other alternative to using a property rule for esthetic designs is
to retain the status quo by giving them no protection and just importing
what we need from countries that start from a different premise about
the rights of designers. Indeed, over the last hundred years imports
have been the solution to the design dilemma. It should come as no
surprise, therefore, that agitation for design reform often coincides with
periods of strong protectionist sentiment. 9 Turning to trade as a way of
closing the gap between the amount of intellectual property society
wants and the amount that legal rules can help create is not always
desirable. Relying on imported product designs, however, raises no
significant concerns. Thus, unless one is broadly sympathetic to
protectionism, there should be serious reservations about abandoning
our longstanding policy of importing designs in favor of imposing new
regulations.
Part II explains the appeal of a new industrial design statute by
examining the byzantine state of the law with respect to commercial art.
Part III reviews what goes into deciding whether to grant property rights
and discusses the special problems posed by incremental innovations.
Part IV uses a variety of doctrinal, historical, and pragmatic tools to
show why most ornamental designs do not deserve property protection.
Part V explores the nuances of possessory rules and describes the
problem of crafting one to fit the design context. Part VI examines why
trade is still the best approach for consumers who seek variety and
19. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1404 (noting that a design protection statute might be
appropriate "if it can be purged of its protectionist dross."); Goldenberg, supra note 4, at 58
("Design protection was seen as a way to protect American industry without raising trade
barriers or other tariffs.").
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beauty at an affordable price.
II. A RAGGED QUILT OF PROTECTION
Although product designs are the outlaws of intellectual property,
there are still options for innovators who want to secure their work from
copying by aggressive competitors. This Part explores how commercial
art may be classified as a patent, a copyright, or a trademark. A
doctrinal review reveals the gaps in the current protective scheme that
fuels the interest in a new design statute.
A. Design Patent

Design patents are the primary tool for encouraging the
development of commercial art in the United States." While Great
Britain was using copyright principles to protect designs when our
Constitution was framed, the issue was ignored by Congress during the
early years of the Republic.21
By 1842, however, the Patent
Commissioner began lobbying for an amendment of the patent statutes
to aid designers.22 He explained that "[m]any who visit the Patent Office
learn with astonishment that no protection is given in this country to this
class of persons."23 Echoing the equal treatment argument of modern
design reform proponents, the Commissioner asked "if authors can so
readily find protection in their labors, and inventors of the mechanical
arts so easily secure a patent to reward their efforts, why should not
discoverers of designs, the labor and expenditure of which may be far
greater, have equal privileges afforded them?"24
The decision to place designs under patent law rather than under
copyright or trademark was largely an accident of circumstance. At that
time, the Patent Office was the only administrative agency that focused
exclusively on intellectual property.25 Thus, patent principles wielded
20. See Dratler, supra note 4, at 888.
21. See 27 Geo. III, c. 38 (providing "for the encouragement of the arts of designing and
printing linens, cottons, calicoes and muslins" through copyright).
22. See Thomas B. Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent
Protection in the United States, 30 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 380, 380-81 (1948)
(letter of Patent Commissioner Ellsworth).
23. Id. at 380.
24. Id. at 381.
25. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 1, 16 Stat. 198. It was not until 1870 that a second
administrative agency for intellectual property-the Copyright Office-was established. See
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1118 n.89 (1991).
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disproportionate influence over policy makers at the federal level. So,
without giving much thought to whether patents and esthetic designs
were a good match, Congress just deferred to the Commissioner's
request and established a design patent system that has remained
remarkably stable over time." The modern version of the design patent
statute provides, in pertinent part, that "any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufactur[ing]" shall receive the
same bundle of property rights that an invention gets under a utility
patent. 27 Design and utility patents are governed by comparable
substantive standards, and applications for each are subjected to the
same tough process of administrative review.2" In fact, other than the
subject matter they cover, the only real difference between a design
patent and a utility patent is that the former lasts for fourteen years
while the latter runs for twenty.29
Although design patents have a long and distinguished history,
advocates of strong property rights for commercial art scorn them.3"
This hostility stems from the numerous difficulties involved in obtaining
and retaining this kind of patent. The result, as one commentator
explains, is that "design patent remains a Cinderella who never goes to
the ball."3 ' Specifically, innovators who want a design patent face three
obstacles that sharply limit their access to protection.
First, the standards that govern utility patents are not suited for
regulating esthetic designs and present applicants with a high burden of
proof. Established doctrine holds that a patent can be granted only if an
invention or design is "novel and not 'obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which [the
invention] pertains'., 32 The novelty and nonobviousness requirements
are necessary in the utility patent context to prevent the private
ownership of basic scientific and engineering concepts that would
26. See Act of August 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543. An exception involves the 1870
amendment to the design patent laws, which turned into the only serious effort to protect
marginal improvements with a property rule. See infra Part IV.B.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
28. See id. (stating that the laws "relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents
for designs, except as otherwise provided..."); Dratler, supranote 4, at 892-94.
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000); 34 U.S.C. § 173 (2000).
30. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 4, at 888 ("[Djesign patents often do not afford
commercially practicable protection."); Welkowitz, supra note 15, at 293 ("[M]any designers
believe that design patent protection is inadequate for the task and desire more protection
than the law currently affords.").
31. Brown, supra note 10, at 1356.
32. Dratler, supra note 4, at 892 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)).
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impede research and impose serious costs on society.
Mandating novelty and nonobviousness for designs, on the other
hand, is confusing and not helpful if the goal is to extend generous
protection. To see this point more clearly, think of these two elements
as part of a broader test to determine whether an improvement
represents an "advance" over the state of the art in a given field.
Viewed in these terms, one commentator has observed that, "[w]hereas
it may often be possible to recognize a technological innovation as an
'advance' because of its efficiency in promoting economies or in
achieving previously unattainable utilitarian ends, there exist no
comparable criteria of 'advance' for artistic creations."33 Indeed, most
designs simply involve rearranging basic artistic elements (e.g., colors,
shapes, and materials) into a new pattern. The result of this reshuffling
process can almost always be considered obvious-and hence
unpatentable-because any designer could have come up with the
combination at issue.35 Put another way, the nonobviousness and
novelty requirements often end up restricting design protection to those
rare instances when an improvement establishes an entirely new style.3"
This leaves most designers out of luck and is at odds with the reality that
commercial art is generally incremental in nature.
A second, though related, problem with applying utility patent
concepts to ornamental designs is that this inevitably drags patent
examiners and judges into making esthetic judgments. Determining the
novelty or nonobviousness of an artistic improvement is an inherently
subjective inquiry. Lawyers cannot just go into a phone booth and
change into art critics. For one thing, members of the bar are not
trained to make subtle esthetic assessments-a problem that is
exacerbated by the fact that there are no settled criteria for evaluating
artistic merit. More importantly, it is impossible to achieve any
consistency in results when each design patent is judged by a different
person's stylistic sensibility.

33. Note, supra note 10, at 1522.
34. See Dratler, supra note 4, at 892 ("The designer's art focuses not on the creation of
new and nonobvious techniques... but on the use of old ones in well-known ways to develop
useful products.").
35. While the drafters of the last major amendment to the patent laws (in 1952) were
aware of this problem, they could not agree on an alternative test for designs. See In re
Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring).
36. See, e.g., Goldenberg, supra note 4, at 22 ("A new pattern for silverware, a new
typeface, or a new lace pattern are not 'novel' under the definition set up by the patent
office ...").
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Injecting artistic tastes into the heart of the patent process has,
unsurprisingly, resulted in a judicial invalidation of a substantial number
of design patents. Indeed, a study in the early 1980s showed that
seventy percent of all design patents granted by the Patent Office were
voided when their validity was challenged." One explanation for this
significant reversal rate is that, on an appeal of a decision to grant a
patent, the Federal Circuit applies de novo review to the issues of
novelty and nonobviousness In conducting that analysis, the esthetic
sense of the appellate panel could easily contradict the views of the
patent examiner and produce a different outcome. Just imagine the
immense frustration this creates for designers. Even if a product meets
all of the strict standards for a design patent, its fate ultimately rests with
the esthetic preferences of a few judges.
Finally, these difficulties are compounded by the significant cost of
obtaining a design patent. It typically costs thousands of dollars and
takes twenty months for a design patent to be approved by the Patent
Office. These administrative burdens are more tolerable for people
seeking a utility patent than for those seeking a design patent. While
the ordinary mechanical invention generates a substantial and durable
revenue stream, the average design produces a much smaller and more
fleeting benefit. Yet despite the clear difference in the income that
flows from utility and design patents, the effort involved to obtain each
is about the same. This misguided symmetry discourages many
designers from even bothering to apply for protection.
With all of these troubles swirling about the Patent Office, it is no
wonder that supporters of broad rights for commercial art avoid design
patent like the plague. Instead, they look to other branches of
intellectual property that might supplant patent as the dominant
paradigm for ornamental design protection.
B. Copyright

In the search for a better way to regulate designs, the first logical
place to turn is copyright. The Copyright Office already protects many

37. See Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality?
Twenty Years of Design Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 10 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 195, 209 (1985). There are
indications that the Federal Circuit has been more deferential to the Patent Office in recent
years, but that deference should be codified in some fashion.
38. See, e.g., In re Klein, 987 F.2d 1569, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
39. Dratler, supra note 4, at 893-94.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[86:845

items, such as jewelry, that could be considered commercial art."° While
the property rights conveyed by a copyright are more limited than those
granted by a patent, it is much easier to obtain a copyright. 4' That is
because the copyright statute extends protection to all "original" works
(i.e., ones that are not copies and show some minimal creativity) that fall
within a broad spectrum of expressive media.
Obviously, from the artist's perspective, this relaxed standard
eliminates many of design patent's flaws. The burden facing applicants
is slight and allows easy access to protection. The administrative process

is cheap and simple. And since there is no need for copyrights to be
novel or nonobvious, the sticky issue of having to evaluate the artistic
merit of ornamental designs is rendered moot. This bundle of benefits,
along with the established protection of some specialized commercial art
by copyright law, has convinced most design supporters that this is the
best model for a new design statute.43 Consequently, the most serious
reform proposal in recent years was "about 95% copyright.""
Using copyright to protect designs, however, may violate a
fundamental axiom of intellectual property law. Ralph S. Brown, who
was a leading light in copyright for decades, once stated that "[t]he
dominant concern of the law protecting designs of useful articles has
been to keep design and utility separated. ,4 Whatever one thinks about
the merits of protecting esthetic innovations, there is a consensus that
utilitarian improvements should be given property rights only pursuant
to the careful limits established by the utility patent laws. A thread
40. See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and IndustrialDesign: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 710-11 (1983).
41. For example, a copyright is subject to a number of exceptions that fall under the
category of "fair use." See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing fair use exceptions that include the
use of copyrighted material for research, criticism, or news reporting). By contrast, there is
no fair use doctrine for patents. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrineof FairUse in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (advocating the creation of a fair use defense
for utility patents).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (listing eight broad categories of work that can receive
copyright protection); Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1989) (holding
that a compilation of facts cannot obtain copyright protection because no originality was
involved in assembling them).
43. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 1357 (cautiously endorsing the use of copyright
principles for designs); Frenkel, supra note 4, at 565-71 (recommending the adaptation of the
special copyright that protects architectural works); see also Denicola, supra note 40, at 70708 (supporting a reinterpretation of the copyright statute to cover esthetic designs).
44. Brown, supra note 10, at 1398. Granted, a design copyright would need to have a
much shorter term than a standard copyright, see supra note 14, but in all other respects it
could be the same.
45. Brown, supra note 10, at 1341.
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running throughout intellectual property doctrine, therefore, is that
people must not be allowed to maneuver around the patent examiners
by smuggling functional features into other property instruments.46
Unfortunately, the problem with using copyright for designs is that
such a practice would provide an excellent vehicle for patent smugglers.
People who want to dodge the patent process could easily do so by
slapping a design on a functional item and claiming that the integrated
product deserves copyright protection. That possibility became real in
1954 when the Supreme Court held that a manufacturer could copyright
a lamp base that doubled as a statue of a female dancer.4 ' The Court
correctly observed that there was "nothing in the copyright statute to
support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an
article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration."48 The
Court did not, however, explain how to separate genuine designs that
should receive copyrights from shams intended to circumvent utility
patent law.
Filling the void that the Justices left behind, Congress eventually
amended the copyright statute and developed a doctrine that is now
called "conceptual separability" to draw the necessary distinction.
While this revision permitted copyright protection of "[p]ictorial,
graphic, and sculptural work[]," the text went on to specify that,
[T]he design of a useful article... shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.49
The legislative history offered little insight into the meaning of this
provision, so the thankless task of clarifying what constituted the design
of a useful article fell upon the circuit courts. Bereft of any real
guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, the circuit courts have
understandably floundered on the issue and created "an increasingly
unintelligible body of law."50 At the moment, there are at least five tests
46. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001)
(describing the functionality defense to trademark validity); see also infra notes 49-52 and
accompanying text (setting forth conceptual separability in copyright).
47. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,212-13 & n.22 (1954).
48. Id. at 218.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
50. Keith Aoki, Contradictionand Context in American Copyright Law, 9 CARDOZO
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being used to delineate the critical boundary between design and
utility."1 Of course, these tests yield widely different results and have all
come under fire for one reason or another.
A more fundamental point is lurking behind this doctrinal mess: any
regime of expanded design protection brings with it the cost of allowing
some functional improvements to evade the patent laws. Even if the
courts could agree on a single test for conceptual separability, this
outcome cannot be avoided because the line between design and utility
is inherently fuzzy. In the end, the only way to stop the smugglers is by
refusing to give designs much protection.
Yet this may be an
unnecessarily harsh choice. After all, some level of patent smuggling is
tolerated in other types of intellectual property. The real question-to
be taken up later-is whether the threat of broad patent smuggling is
particularly strong in the esthetic design context.
In sum, copyrights do not offer much help to designers. The fault
lies mostly with the incoherence of the conceptual separability doctrine,
which makes obtaining a design copyright almost as unpredictable as
applying for a design patent. Even assuming that this confusion could
be removed, however, a deeper question would remain regarding
whether the potential for patent smuggling is worth the benefits of
broad design protection through copyright.
C. Trademark
Because patents and copyrights do not give designers what they
desire, some have urged that trademark law take up the challenge. 3

ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303,383-84 (1991).
51. One approach is the primary-subsidiary test, which holds that an article can obtain
copyright protection only if its primary purpose is esthetic. See Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980) (ruling that an artistic belt buckle
could be copyrighted). A second formulation states that copyrights can only encompass items
where the esthetic aspect is not "inextricably intertwined" with its utilitarian components.
See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (denying
protection to human torso mannequins). A third perspective contends that a feature is
eligible for copyright, "only when the non-utilitarian concept can be entertained in the mind
of the ordinary observer without at the same time contemplating the utilitarian function." Id.
at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting). Candidate number four is the artistic judgment test, which
asks courts to focus on the intent of the designer and grant copyrights only to items that are
primarily driven by esthetic motivations. See Denicola, supra note 40, at 741. Finally, at least
one court looked at the totality of the circumstances without picking any specific test. See
Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 892-94 (9th Cir. 1983).
52. For an excellent discussion of these five tests and their flaws, see Frenkel, supra note
4, at 546-54.
53. Compare Dratler, supra note 4, at 889 (stating that "trademark principles may be
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Trademark doctrine does play an indirect role in spurring design
improvements. Yet recent developments indicate that this body of law
is also incapable of delivering comprehensive protection for commercial
art.
The purpose of trademarks is to assist consumers in obtaining
information about goods and services. As a result, trademark doctrine
is different from the other branches of intellectual property because it is
not concerned with stimulating the creation of new works." Instead, its
goal is to ensure that each manufacturer has an incentive to mark its
goods so that a consumer can identify the source, quality, and retail
location of those items. 5 To achieve this limited aim, trademark law
extends limited rights. A mark is protected only from commercial uses
that substantially interfere with its ability to convey information, which
is usually defined as those uses that cause a likelihood of consumer

confusion under infringement doctrine. 6 This is narrower than the
scope of copyright or patent protection. On the other hand, copyrights
and patents have a fixed term of years, while trademark rights last as
long as the mark is used in commerce.'
more appropriate for the task" of protecting designs), with Welkowitz, supra note 15, at 290
(arguing that "trademark law is being made to serve the wrong role" when it focuses on
design rights).
54. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J.
759, 768 (1991) ("[T]rademark law may be described as indifferent to the creation of marks,
in the sense that the number of marks makes no difference."). Trademark law does not care
about providing incentives for developing new marks because "[a]n increased number of
copyrights and patents may generate social value, but more (or more clever) trademarks do
no such thing. Simply put, this is because marks do not actually affect the quality of goods
and services." Magliocca, supra note 16, at 980.
In a previous article, I left open the possibility that ornamental designs were an exception
to this principle because "a pleasing product design might well add value to certain products."
Id. at n.159. After considering the issue further, however, I have concluded for the reasons
stated in this section that there is no such exception. More important than my opinion is the
fact that the Supreme Court effectively decided the issue in Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
55. This fundamental triad of trademark functions-source, quality, and retail
location-is described elsewhere. See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 956.
56. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(setting forth the modern likelihood of confusion over the test for trademark infringement);
Magliocca, supranote 16, at 954-55. In addition to infringement, there is a broader theory of
relief called dilution, which is defined by federal law as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and service, regardless of the.., likelihood of
confusion." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Trademark dilution is a controversial and poorly
understood concept. See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 951-54; see also Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003) (construing dilution narrowly).
57. See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 979-80; infra note 62.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[86:845

Ornamental designs fit into a trademark paradigm because they
sometimes relay useful information to consumers. While most marks
are words or logos, there is a category of marks called "trade dress" that
refers to the look of a product." A classic example of trade dress is the
tail fin that Cadillac puts on its cars. The tail fin is distinctive and tells
consumers that they are looking at a Cadillac. In trademark parlance,
this feature acquired secondary meaning through extensive use and
became associated with a particular brand. If another company were to
add tail fins to its cars, Cadillac would have a claim for trademark
infringement on the ground that the competitor was creating a
likelihood of consumer confusion by passing its cars off as Cadillacs.
Trade dress also performs a purely esthetic function that opens the
door to robust design protection. Quite apart from its properties as a
trademark, a tail fin is a pleasing design that makes some people more
likely to buy a Cadillac. That is probably what motivated Cadillac to put
tail fins on cars in the first place. Thus, a court that enjoins other
automobile manufacturing firms from using tail fins based on consumer
confusion grounds could also be described as protecting the design itself
from unauthorized copying. 9
Taking advantage of the dual nature of trade dress, designers often
try to obtain protection for their work by claiming that it performs an
identifying function for consumers: As long as a design really is acting
as a trademark, this does not usually present a problem." One could say
that the indirect protection of designs through trademark undermines
the design patent system, but the alternative of giving no trademark
protection to designs that happen to be appealing would disrupt the
58. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235,1238-40 (6th Cir. 1991).
59. Trademark protection in this respect acts as a property rule with certain
inalienability restrictions. For instance, a firm cannot just license its mark for anyone to use.
Since a mark conveys information about the quality of its goods, courts generally require the
mark owner to impose some quality controls on a licensee to ensure that the information
conveyed to consumers by the mark will not be distorted. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1959).
60. There is an interesting irony here. While in modern times trademarks are used to
protect ornamental designs, in the Nineteenth Century, design patents were used to protect
trademarks. See infra Part IV.A. This symmetry between trademarks and designs is
important in assessing the merits of a new industrial design law. See id.
61. An exception is made for trade dress that is "esthetically functional," which in most
circuits means that "without it other producers of the product could not compete effectively."
W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 346 (7th Cir. 1985). Though some courts take a
broader view of esthetic functionality, that disagreement does not affect the analysis in the
text. See generally Mitchell M. Wong, Note, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrineand the Law
of Trade-DressProtection,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116 (1998) (providing an overview).
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trademark system.62
Some commentators have argued, however, that courts in trade
dress cases went further and "consciously craft[ed] the law to encourage
the development of creative and pleasing designs" by giving protection
to designs that were not really marks at all.63 In particular, these critics
argue that courts frequently classified designs as "inherently distinctive"
marks that did not require secondary meaning to obtain trademark
protection." Simply put, that meant an innovator did not need to offer
any proof that a design conveyed information to consumers. Pursued to
its logical conclusion, this line of authority would have allowed most
commercial art to be considered trademarks. This may well have been
the objective of judges seeking to remedy the shortcomings of design
patents.
Even though the scope of trademark protection is narrower than the
protection copyrights or patents receive, stimulating the development of
commercial art through trademark law is still problematic because its
term of protection is indefinite. Real marks require this security
because consumers do not stop associating a mark with a given brand
after the expiration of some arbitrary time limit.65 However, permitting
62. This is different from the patent smuggling issue discussed earlier. Here, the
protection of designs through trademark is necessary to avoid consumer confusion. Giving
protection to commercial art through copyright, however, is not necessary to fulfill the
objectives of the copyright system. Moreover, utility patent smuggling involves greater costs
than design patent smuggling. In the utility patent context, there is often only one way to
achieve a particular gain in efficiency. Thus, granting protection to that unique improvement
through a copyright, which lasts much longer than a patent, creates serious problems for
By contrast, there are almost always some
subsequent research and development.
alternatives to a design that gets protection through trademark law. Whether these
alternatives are sufficient to support a design property right, however, is another matter. See
infra Part IV.C.
63. Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75
MINN. L. REV. 769, 785 (1991); see Brown, supra note 10, at 1359; Gleiberman, supra note 16,
at 2072; Reichman, supra note 12, at 2463-64.
64. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992); Brown, supra
note 10, at 1374-83; Glieberman, supra note 16, at 2040-44. Inherent distinctiveness refers to
marks that have no real purpose other than associating goods with brands. See Dratler, supra
note 4, at 902. A well-known example is Kodak, which is a coined word that has no meaning
apart from the brand.
This should raise a red flag about the propriety of classifying product designs as
inherently distinctive. Putting aside the policy objections, we know that design trade dress
does have a purpose other than identifying brands; it is esthetically appealing. Thus, the
Supreme Court's recent decision that designs can never be inherently distinctive must be
correct. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205,212-13 (2000).
65. Unlike copyright law, therefore, the problem of a trademark's lengthy term cannot
be cured by a statutory amendment without causing major problems. See supra note 44.
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designs that are not genuine marks to obtain protection that often lasts
forever would harm the balance intellectual property tries to strike
between private incentives and the public domain. Though the nature
of this compromise will be discussed shortly, just consider the
consequences if styles were granted perpetual protection. While the
initial effect would be positive-there would be a rush of resources into
designs to reap the windfall of future gains-consumers would pay the
piper in higher prices and reduced design variety in the long run.
Partisans on both sides spilled wells of ink on whether trademark
doctrine should directly protect designs, but the Supreme Court has now
rendered this question virtually moot. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros.,66 Samara sought trade dress protection for "a line of
spring/summer one-piece seersucker outfits decorated with appliquds of
hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like."67 The lower courts held that this
combination of basic design elements was inherently distinctive trade
dress.68 Reversing this judgment, a unanimous Supreme Court held that
product designs could never be inherently distinctive and always need
secondary meaning to warrant trademark protection.69
In articulating this bright-line rule, the Court was keenly aware of
the costs of permitting designs to be classified as inherently distinctive.
As the Court observed, "[c]onsumers should not be deprived of the
benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic
purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that
facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon
alleged inherent distinctiveness. 7 0 Candidly stating its policy views, the
Court explained that "the game of allowing suit based upon alleged
inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle[, and this] is
especially so since the producer can ordinarily obtain protection for a
design.., by securing a design patent or a copyright."7'
Samara Bros. snuffs out the possibility of using trademarks as a
major tool for design protection.72 Few ornamental designs can obtain
Think about the confusion that would result if the property rights of brands like Coca-Cola or
Nike were suddenly stripped and could be used by anyone.
66. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
67. Id. at 207.
68. Id. at 208.
69. Id. at 212.
70. Id. at 213.
71. Id. at 214.
The Court's holding was also amply supported by doctrinal
considerations. See supra note 64.
72. There may be a small gap in this barrier. In its decision, the Court distinguished a
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secondary meaning because crossing this magic threshold requires a
great deal of time and advertising to create the necessary awareness
among consumers. Actually, it probably costs more to infuse a design
with secondary meaning than to obtain a design patent. More
importantly, it is very difficult for an innovator to prevent others from
copying a design during the period when it is trying to garner secondary
meaning. Once that design is used by competitors, it will no longer be
able to obtain that meaning because consumers will no longer associate

the feature with a single brand.
In the end, trademark law provides little help to commercial artists.
However, there is something amiss with the Supreme Court's argument
that trademark protection for most esthetic designs is not necessary
because patent and copyright can easily take up the slack. As the
preceding discussion explained, that contention is false. We must
therefore address the question of whether a new industrial design

statute is necessary. 73
III. THE PROPRIETY OF PROPERTY

A balanced assessment of any proposal for design reform should
begin by acknowledging the special problems posed by trying to protect
incremental innovations. This Part first explores the rationale for
granting entitlements and shows how marginal improvements in
intellectual property dance along the line that divides property from
possession. Then the discussion identifies some markers that can shape
the analysis of whether designs are a form of creativity that should be
protected by a property rule.

prior case that found the interior and exterior design of a restaurant to be inherently
distinctive. SamaraBros., 529 U.S. at 214-15 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763 (1992)). The Court stated that this trade dress involved product packaging, which
could be inherently distinctive, rather than product design, which cannot be. See id. at 215
(suggesting that a restaurant design might also constitute "some tertium quid"). Thus,
designers might try to recharacterize their work as product packaging in order to get
inherently distinctive status. The Court anticipated this end run, however, and explained that
courts should call ambiguous trade dress product design and require secondary meaning. Id.
So perhaps there is no room to maneuver after all.
73. One final thought is that designs could be protected under the "misappropriation"
doctrine established in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,248 U.S. 215 (1918). In
that case, the Supreme Court held that news wire dispatches that were not subject to
copyright were, nonetheless, protected from copying because they were a form of property.
See id. at 240-41. This decision has not been well received and is now confined to its facts.
For the classic statement on why this doctrine does not apply to designs, see Cheney Bros. v.
Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,280 (2d Cir. 1929).
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A. The Real PropertyPerspective
Basic economics dictates that property rights help promote the
efficient allocation of resources. Without the ability to exclude others
from interfering with our possessions, there would be little incentive to
invest in improvements that create growth. Given the importance of
clear title to a healthy capitalist system, the decision to grant a property
right is usually an easy one, with the legal tool of choice being the fee
simple. The fee simple arrangement evolved at common law and
generally provides the best incentives by granting perpetual protection
to the interest in question.74 For example, the fee simple's duration gives
property owners the flexibility to subdivide their interests in ways that
can lead to a superior utilization of resources. A potentially infinite
time horizon also gives the ultimate assurance that owners will reap the
benefits of their investments. Perhaps most importantly, the fee simple
minimizes the administrative costs of having property. The state could,
and sometimes does, protect entitlements through complex regulations
enforced by armies of bureaucrats. Yet the administrative costs of this
scheme are high and often cannot compete with a fee simple world
where individual owners make decisions based on superior information.
Nevertheless, there are still administrative costs associated with
property rights that should not be overlooked. Specifically, property
claims generally need to be recorded and ownership disputes need to be
resolved. Maintaining a sound property regime therefore requires that
people have some notice of who owns what and a way to handle the
inevitable conflicts that arise. Although these administrative costs are
an integral part of every property rule, they are usually dwarfed by the
efficiency gains created by a property right. As the benefits diminish,
however, these costs begin to loom as an important factor.
B. The Nuances of Intellectual Property
The utility of property rules remains strong when information is
involved, but intellectual property has special qualities that must be
taken into account. At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that most
intellectual creations need some property protection. An artist or
inventor invests significant time and labor to produce something, while a
competitor can then copy the same work for virtually nothing.
Therefore, unless the law extends some property rights to innovators,

74. See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutionsfor Old Neighborhoods,48 DUKE L.J. 75,
94 (1998).
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developers will usually be unable to recoup their investment and will
have little incentive to produce anything new.75
Intellectual property, on the other hand, is different than real
property and cannot be given fee simple protection. Art and invention
always build upon prior work and require significant access to the
creative past. Modern painters use a form of linear perspective that was
developed during the Renaissance. Authors constantly recycle plot
lines and motifs. Further, inventors or scientists, in the words of
Newton, make discoveries only by standing "on the shoulders of
giants."76 If breakthroughs such as these were granted the robust rights
of a fee simple, the opportunity for future advances would be drastically
curtailed. As a result, intellectual property law always seeks to balance
private incentives with the need to keep the public domain stocked with
raw materials.
In operational terms, this equilibrium is usually
maintained by some combination of: (1) a time limit on intellectual
property rights; and (2) broad exceptions to their exclusivity.
The need to calibrate intellectual property protection means that it is
burdened by error costs that exceed the standard administrative costs
that apply to all property. In other words, a serious risk involved in
granting entitlements to information is that too much protection will go
to the current generation at the expense of posterity. Overprotection is
the more serious danger because the future has no lobby in Congress.
That somewhat cynical assertion is borne out by the relentless expansion
of intellectual property rights in recent decades." While some of those
advances were justified, it is striking that Congress has not once
withdrawn significant protection for artistic or inventive works in favor
of the public domain over the last century. Tellingly, the last time
Congress did withdraw this type of protection was in 1902, when design
patents were rolled back because their broad scope had created too
many legal headaches.78
C. IncrementalInnovations

By melding the observations from the previous two sections, the
dilemma of granting protection to marginal intellectual property
75. For a more elaborate discussion of the economics of intellectual property, see
Lichtman, supra note 12, at 700-08.
76. Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675), in THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 362 (3d ed. 1979).
77. See statutes cited supra note 7.
78. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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changes comes into focus. First, incremental improvements generate
small benefits that are often exceeded by the administrative costs that
are required to maintain a property right. Second, the short duration of
these innovations means that the costs associated with miscalculating
the optimal term of protection can be quite high. Each of these issues
will be examined in turn.
1. Administrative Costs
The administrative cost point is best analogized to the concept of
friction in physics. Friction is always present when bodies are in motion.
That force is barely noticeable most of the time because the movement
going on around us is so fast. But as these motions slow down, the
power of friction becomes quite apparent. Indeed, there comes a point
where the force on an object is so low that it cannot overcome friction.
All of these observations apply to the administrative costs of the
property system. While these costs are always present, their impact on
property is usually invisible because the benefits generated by
entitlements are so great. There is an equilibrium position, however,
where the benefits become so small that they are matched by the
administrative costs of the property rule. Once the tipping point is
reached, it becomes difficult to justify granting a property right.
Incremental innovations dwell in this twilight zone because the
difference between the benefits they generate and the costs necessary to
support them is razor thin.
2. The Precision of Protection
If administrative costs were the only stumbling block in deciding
whether subtle improvements should get property protection, most
legislators would probably not be fazed. After all, an incorrect choice
would impose few costs and upset hardly anyone except a few
professors. Regrettably, however, there are other serious consequences
that flow from an erroneous judgment about incremental innovations in
intellectual property.
The short duration of intellectual property benefits means that even
a small amount of overprotection can do serious harm to future
creativity. This point relates back to the need to balance intellectual
property rights between the private and public spheres.79 An important
part of reaching this balance is putting an appropriate time limit on the
79. See supra Part II.

2003]

ORNAMENTAL DESIGN

protection of information. Of course, figuring out what is appropriate in
a given context is tricky. Luckily, the consequences of making a mistake
in the term of something like a copyright are not dire."0 Suppose that
the optimal term for a new copyright is forty years. If we give copyright
owners fifty years of protection instead, that means they would be
receiving twenty percent more protection than they should. The
resulting distortion in resources, while significant, is probably something
that most consumers and future authors can tolerate."' That equanimity
stems from the fact that the optimal term for copyrights is quite long
and thus, on a percentage basis, this mistake in terms of copyright
protection is small.
The same is not true for incremental improvements, such as
commercial art, which usually have a very short lifespan. Perhaps the
best example involves fashion designs, which last for just those few
months that comprise the current "season." 2 Since the term of
protection for fashion is so short, a miscalculation of that term is more
likely to hamstring future creativity. Let us assume that the optimal
term for a given incremental improvement is three months. If we give
that item a year of protection-not a big difference from a legislator's
point of view-that is 400% of the optimal protection. Put another way,
the brevity of an incremental innovation's optimal term means that the
margin 3of error for protecting this type of creativity is exceptionally
8

narrow.

80. Copyright is the appropriate example here because advocates of broad design
protection use it as their model. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
81. In my view, this closely resembles the current state of affairs in copyright. Thirty
years ago, Professor (now Justice) Breyer made a convincing argument that "[tjhe period of
copyright protection is at present too long and should not be extended beyond fifty-six years
[plus the life of the author]." Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 350
(1970). Of course, copyright protection now lasts for seventy years plus the life of the author.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). Yet few complaints have been raised beyond academic circles
about this gradual progression in copyright's reach. One might wonder, however, whether
the increasing acceptance of copyright piracy via the downloading of music and movies on the
Internet represents a kind of citizen nullification of the excessive protection being given to
copyright owners.
82. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) (rejecting a
misappropriation claim brought by a fashion design house). Obviously, no clothing design
goes out of style forever, though neither the hoop-and-corset for women or plus-fours for
men will be on runways anytime soon.
83. A strong objection can be made that the analysis in the text is unduly focused on the
length of protection rather than on the costs of additional protection. Perhaps a distortion in
a utility patent term of four percent is actually more dangerous than a 400% distortion in the
esthetic design term because patents have a far greater impact on the economy.
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3. An Unruly Cycle
Due to these twin issues of administrative costs and protection
precision, the law has oscillated between granting and withdrawing
property protection for incremental innovations. The pattern was aptly
described by J.H. Reichman as beginning with "chronic underprotection
in industrial property laws[, which] leads to chronic overprotection in
artistic property law, which in turn inspires further reactive reforms of
industrial property law tending to reinstate levels of underprotection
that will foster renewed appeals to copyright law."84 Characterizing this
as a ping-pong between "protection" and "no protection" is appropriate
because, as we already know, applying industrial property (i.e., patent)
law to designs means that they will get little protection, while applying
copyright or trademark law does just the opposite.85
The foregoing discussion explains why making an assessment about
the property status of incremental improvements is difficult. Now the
inquiry turns to how we should make that judgment about commercial
art.
D. Application to Designs

The question of whether ornamental designs should be protected by
a property rule is a difficult one. There is no hard data available to
weigh the competing considerations outlined above. As a result, the
analysis turns on subtle inferences drawn from an array of doctrinal,
historical, and policy factors. Perhaps the most important of these
concerns involve: (1) seeing whether designs look more like copyrights
or trademarks; (2) looking to past experience with design protection;
and (3) evaluating a set of pragmatic factors.
The forthcoming discussion rests on a premise that has been implicit
This criticism has merit when the comparison is between a design and a utility patent, but
when the scene shifts to the more appropriate match of product designs and copyrights, see
infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text, the point has less force. There is no reason to think
that excess protection of the average copyright, with its fair use exceptions and many
alternatives for expressing the same idea, would impose a greater cost on society than an
equivalent length of excess protection given to designs. Even if there is a small distinction
between copyrights and designs in this respect, however, the distinction is outweighed by the
sharp difference in the probable distortions in their terms.
84. Reichman, supra note 12, at 2464.
85. Evidence of this cycle is plentiful. The courts have pushed forward and then scaled
back the use of trade dress to deal with the design issue. See supra notes 63-72 and
accompanying text. Congress and the Patent Office have also lurched between over- and
under-protection of incremental improvements in the Nineteenth Century. See infra Part
IV.B.
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throughout-that ornamental designs are a type of incremental
innovation. Of course, there are some designs that represent a more
significant advance in the state of the art and escape the pitfalls that
catch the more marginal changes. These exceptional breakthroughs are
sometimes solicited through lucrative contracts, but most of the time
they are encouraged through design patents.6 Safeguarding high-value
commercial art is what design patents do well. After all, in spite of their
many flaws, some people still apply for and obtain these patents." Thus,
some innovators must believe that the benefits of their work are so great
that it is worth the time and uncertainty of going through the design
patent process. Viewed from a broader perspective, granting a property
right to these "superdesigns" is an easy decision because their benefits
clearly exceed any administrative costs and will last for a much longer
duration than the average industrial design.
On the harder question posed by incremental design improvements,
the best way to start is by finding an appropriate benchmark of
comparison. There are three possibilities-the familiar trilogy of patent,
copyright, and trademark."8 Although commercial art can be protected
under any of these categories, one of them must be more similar to
product designs than the other two. Deriving the appropriate analogy
for commercial art is handy because it is reasonable to conclude that the
doctrines of the analogous body of law will be the most illuminating for
this inquiry. For instance, we know that patent and copyright are
strongly oriented towards granting property rights to encourage the
development of new work. By contrast, trademark does not extend a
86. Architecture is one area where contracts stimulate major leaps in industrial art, as
architects are often paid large sums to design interesting new buildings. Nevertheless,
Congress decided that it was necessary to pass a special statute making buildings eligible for
copyright protection notwithstanding their status as useful articles. See Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 702, 104 Stat. 5133. Some have
argued that this law is a model for design reform. See Frenkel, supra note 4, at 566. It is this
author's view that the architecture statute is an example of excessive protection that harms
the public and future creators.
87. As a result, the current design patent system performs adequately in giving property
rights to high-value designs while excluding the bulk of commercial art that should not get
protection. There is, however, room for improvement. In particular, the uncertainty created
by permitting the Federal Circuit to second guess the Patent Office should be reduced. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text. The best way to do that is by changing the Federal
Circuit's standard of review on the novelty and nonobviousness of design patents from de
novo to clear error. Although patent examiners may be wrong in their esthetic judgments,
there is no reason to think that robust appellate review of those determinations will lead to
better results.
88. Trade secret is a fourth option, but that speaks to the issue of whether designs should
get protection through a possessory rule. See infra Part V.
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property rule in order to stimulate the production of new resources. As
a result, if commercial art resembles patents or copyrights, this suggests
that designs deserve property protection. If designs look more like
trademarks, however, then that would lead toward the opposite
conclusion.
In reality, the search for guidance in design law comes down to a
choice between copyright and trademark. By providing the strongest of
all possible intellectual property rights, patents are ideally suited for
stimulating large leaps in creativity. At the same time, the patent system
is implacably hostile to the idea of protecting marginal innovations."
That is the essence of the novelty and nonobviousness requirements.
Indeed, the flaws of design patents are a reflection of the inherent
mismatch between most commercial art and patent doctrine. Thus,
patents cannot be a valid benchmark for evaluating the protection of
incremental esthetic designs.
Copyright and trademark, on the other hand, are still in the running.
Not only is copyright a model of choice for many designers, but it also
already protects incremental improvements that are purely esthetic.9°
While the line that separates copyrights for esthetic work from
copyrights for useful articles is unclear, that vagueness does not
preclude the possibility that copyright law provides the best analogy for
designs. Likewise, trademark has also been trumpeted as the best way
to protect designs, and trade dress still offers some indirect protection to
incremental improvements. 9 Trademark law's failings also do not
eliminate its chances of being the best model for thinking about
commercial art. As such, deciding whether copyright or trademark is
the appropriate yardstick for ornamental designs requires a deeper
inquiry.
A second tool that can steer the analysis in the right direction is
experience. In other words, what lessons, if any, can be drawn from
previous efforts to protect esthetic designs? One answer comes from
the cycle of overprotection and underprotection in design law.9" The
flux in the status of designs over time suggests that it is devilishly
89. See Lichtman, supra note 12, at 709-14 (explaining that patent law focuses on
protecting valuable innovations and leaves most marginal improvements unprotected).
90. For instance, if an artist modifies a copyrighted painting or sculpture to make a new
version of an original work, then that version would also be "original" and receive the full
panoply of rights under the copyright statute even though the alteration is clearly
incremental.
91. See supra Part II.C.
92. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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difficult to develop a stable property right in this context. Perhaps that
means society is better off not creating one. Drawing that conclusion on
such slim evidence, however, is hasty. To reach an informed judgment,
we need more evidence on the past performance of a property rule with
respect to esthetic designs.
Finally, while many policy issues bear on the design question, one
point worth explaining now is the relevance of the number of expressive
alternatives that exist for a protected item. Simply put, the more
alternatives there are to express a particular concept, the less costly it is
to give someone ownership over one of those alternatives. This
principle pulsates across the entire spectrum of intellectual property.
For instance, trademark law gives the most protection to arbitrary or
fanciful marks, which usually refer to coined words like "Kodak."93

What distinguishes coined words is that there is virtually an infinite
number of them. Indeed, their supply is limited only by the imagination
of corporate marketing executives. Giving Kodak a virtual monopoly
on commercial uses of that term, therefore, presents almost no cost to
society because there are so many other coined words that competitors
can use. Contrast this with "generic" marks that receive no protection
at all, such as the use of the word "car" as a mark for automobiles. The
problem here is that there are only a few synonyms for "car," so giving
one firm the exclusive use of that term would put competitors at a
serious disadvantage." Just as the number of available alternatives
influences whether a particular creative work should get property
protection, it should also influence whether designs as a group should be
shielded by a property rule.
In sum, intellectual property rights become more problematic as
revolutionary improvements give way to gradual evolution. Esthetic
designs are just the most visible manifestation of the dilemma posed by
incremental improvements. Their status can only be resolved by pulling
together clues scattered over a wide range of law and experience.
IV. EVALUATING A NEW DESIGN PROPERTY RIGHT
This Part takes the guidelines laid in the previous section and applies

93. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (developing a sliding scale of protection based on the distinctiveness of a mark's use on
a given product).
94. Similar concerns are behind the merger doctrine in copyright, which bars protection
when there is only one way to express a given idea. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
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them to designs. The first section illustrates that trademark is the most
analogous body of law for commercial art. Next, the analysis turns to
history and reveals that the Patent Office did extend broad property
rights to incremental improvements during a brief period in the late
Nineteenth Century. That experiment led to such rampant patent
smuggling and confusion, however, that Congress was forced to reverse
course. Lastly, a review of various pragmatic concerns confirms that a
broad property right for designs is unnecessary and potentially harmful.
A. Cousin Trademark
The search for an appropriate benchmark of comparison for
ornamental designs leads straight to trademark law. In fact, two of the
leading commentaries on commercial art explicitly draw on the doctrinal
similarities between designs and trademarks.9" Chief among these
similarities are: (1) their consumer orientation; (2) their infringement
tests; and (3) the widespread use of one to protect the other.
To determine whether designs are more related to trademarks or
copyrights, the best place to start is by looking at the fundamental
purposes underlying these instruments. From the prior discussion, we
know that trademarks focus on the activities of consumers.96 Consistent
with this rationale, the scope of trademark protection is judged on how
one mark relates to others within the marketplace. The test for
infringement and dilution is product-specific and involves more than just
looking at the similarity between the marks.
Indeed, courts in
trademark cases spend most of their time analyzing contextual factors
such as the commercial proximity of the products identified by
competing marks and the strength of their identification by consumers."
Put another way, trademark doctrine is all about ascertaining the
concrete impression that intellectual property leaves with consumers.
By contrast, copyright law is mainly concerned with protecting authors
and their right of expression.9" While it is likely that an author will use a

95. See Dratler, supra note 4; Welkowitz, supra note 15. These pieces reach different
conclusions regarding the relevance of these similarities. Welkowitz argues that the links
suggest that trademark law is improperly intruding into areas that ought to be governed by
patent. Id. at 343. By contrast, Dratler contends that trademark is the best way to govern
designs. See Dratler, supra note 4, at 897.
96. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
97. See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 959 (explaining the multi-factor infringement test);
id. at 984 (setting forth the most common tests for dilution).
98. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 12, at 2452-53 (summarizing the purpose of copyright
law).
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copyright for commercial purposes, that is not an assumption of
copyright doctrine. Thus, the test for copyright protection is not
product-specific and does not take consumers into account at all."
Instead, "the standard for copyright infringement is substantial
similarity in the abstract, divorced from any relationship with particular
products or the marketplace."'°
Viewed from these competing perspectives, ornamental designs fall
squarely on the trademark side because their purpose is to influence
consumer decisions about specific products. As one commentator
correctly observed, "[i]ndustrial designs are not really separate works of
authorship by themselves ....Rather [they] are attributes of products,
intended to assist in their marketing, sale, and use."'' In other words,
designs, like trademarks, are judged solely by the impression they create
in the marketplace. This consumer orientation simply does not exist in
copyright law. 102 Moreover, there is basically no such thing as an
by
abstract product
design in the manner contemplated
copyright--Cadillac tail fins do not get put on lamps or computers
unless someone is trying to evoke that specific brand. Accordingly, with
respect to both their underlying rationale and their application, designs
look more like trademarks than copyrights.
Even advocates of broad design protection who use copyright as
their model concede that the actual function of esthetic designs is closer
to trademarks. One supporter of a failed design reform bill in 1987
explained the issue this way in testimony before Congress:
Distinctively shaped articles and parts would be protected [by
the bill] serving to establish product differentiation. It would
serve a function similar to trademarks in identifying the source
and quality the consumer has come to expect from the source. It
would overcome the natural confusion that what looks the same
comes from the same source and has the same quality. 3

99. Dratler, supra note 4, at 914.
100. Id. at 915.
101. Id. at 913; see also Denicola, supra note 40, at 742-44 (making this distinction and
suggesting that a commercial motivation should be what separates unprotected designs from
those that receive copyright protection).
102. See Dratler, supra note 4, at 914 ("A focus on the product as a whole and its
impression in the marketplace is traditionally more a feature of trademark law than of
copyright law.").
103. Id. (quoting testimony of William S. Thompson, Patent Counsel, Caterpillar, Inc.,
representing the Industrial Design Coalition) (emphasis added).
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This comparison with trademark rings true when we consider that
product designs sometimes do nothing more than distinguish one firm's
items from another. A new style might involve a feature that is
particularly appealing, but often a trend is set by something that is just
different from everything else. The law of product differentiation is
trademark, not copyright.
Given the close relationship between the foundations of trademark
and designs, it is not surprising that both also share a similar test for
defining their respective scopes of protection.' °' Unlike copyright
infringement analyses, where the inquiry basically begins and ends with
a side-by-side comparison of the two works in question, trademark and
design patent infringement focus on the commercial impact of the
competing works."5 While the nuances of trademark infringement
doctrine were settled only forty years ago, designs were placed under a
similar framework nearly a century earlier.'O In Gorham Co. v. White,
the Supreme Court articulated the design patent infringement test:
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one
patented is infringed by the other.0 7
The key here is the Court's emphasis on the ordinary consumer and on
the purchasing decision as the guideposts for design infringement.
Presented with two esthetic designs, a court does not compare them in a
vacuum, as is the case with copyright, but instead attempts to determine
how consumers would view the designs and the commercial impression

104. See Welkowitz, supra note 15, at 343 ("[E]ven a cursory examination of the
elements of trade dress infringement for product configurations and the elements of design
patent infringement reveals marked similarities.").
105. The comparison with design patent is sound in this instance even though that body
of law is not well-aligned with the distinctive qualities of commercial art. Due to the
consumer orientation of designs, the only infringement test that makes sense is one that takes
consumer impressions into account. Besides, the main problem with design patent from the
pro-designer perspective is that it does not cover enough works. That criticism does not
extend to the infringement test applied to those works that do qualify for design patent
protection.
106. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) (analyzing design patent
infringement); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(analyzing trademark infringement).
107. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
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they create. At its core, "this test appears to be one of confusion of
goods: would a consumer buy B's widgets thinking that he or she was
buying A's widgets? As such, it looks like a test that could be used in a
trade dress infringement case."' 8 Thus, another integral aspect of
designs tilts away from copyright and towards trademark.
The last telling point in this comparison is the ancient link between
designs and trademarks through which one source of law was used to
cover perceived shortcomings in the other. In a previous discussion,
much was made of the efforts to extend trade dress over esthetic
designs. 9 When this pairing is inverted, a similar phenomenon appears.
While trademark law was used in the Twentieth Century to protect
designs, design patent law was used in the Nineteenth Century to
This reciprocal relationship simply has no
protect trademarks.
counterpart in the pairing of designs and copyright.
For instance, a leading treatise observed in 1914 that "[s]oon after
the passage of the [design patent] Act of 1842 attempts were made to
protect trademarks under that Act, and some two hundred design
patents were issued for 'designs for trademarks."'" 0 There is no
suggestion that Congress wanted to cover trademarks through design
patents, but trademark law was never intended to protect esthetic
designs either."' In both cases, the lack of protection in one area-there
was no federal trademark system for most of the Nineteenth Century
and there are no broad design rights now-led people to press the other
closely-related doctrine into service to serve a dual function. Once
again, the similarities between trademark and design are much greater
than whatever connection links copyright and designs.
Accordingly, on the fundamental pillars of intent, scope of
protection, and interchangeability, the answer is the same: designs most
closely resemble trademarks. This conclusion provides one answer to
the most compelling argument for design protection-that designs
deserve the same treatment as copyrights. This otherwise powerful plea

108. Welkowitz, supra note 15, at 344. This does not mean that all of the trademark
infringement factors should apply to designs, and design patent law has wisely avoided
incorporating trademark norms "jot-for-jot." As a practical matter, however, both claims are
analyzed in a similar way. See id. at 345.
109. See supra notes 63-64, 66-68 and accompanying text.
110. WILLIAM L. SYMONS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 35 (1914). This
practice continued until Congress established a separate trademark system. See Ex parte
King, C.D. 109 (1870), reprinted in HECTOR T. FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR

DESIGNS 245,246-47 (Philadelphia, Campbell ed. 1889).
ill. See SYMONS, supra note 110, at 35.
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for non-discrimination does not work in this context because designs
and copyrights are substantially different. Also, given trademark law's
rejection of a broad property right, the similarity between designs and
marks actually points toward the conclusion that designs are not entitled
to sweeping protection.
B. HistoricalPast

The next fruitful area of inquiry is the law's experience with
protecting incremental designs. Delve into design patent law of the
Nineteenth Century and a wonderful treasure awaits-the only actual
use of a broad property rule for commercial art. Delve a little further,
however, and it becomes clear that this experiment was a disaster. In
response to the problems created by granting property rights to
incremental designs, Congress reestablished the narrow system of design
protection that is the subject of so much criticism today." Since this
fascinating period has not received the attention it deserves, the details
of that time are set forth below at some length.
The story begins with an opinioft handed down by the Patent
Commissioner shortly before Congress amended the design patent
statute in 1870."' Ruling in Ex parte Crane on a design patent
application for an elegant box that held women's furs, the
Commissioner began by noting that the item was denied a utility patent
because it was not "what might properly be termed a 'new invention.' , 4
Nevertheless, he held that the box could get a design patent.15 To reach
this conclusion, the Commissioner took the line that design patents
could be granted for designs that were ornamental or functional, even
while conceding that this interpretation was a novel one."6 A logical
corollary of Crane's controversial proposition was that a design could
meet the requirements of patent law through a combination of esthetic
and utilitarian features even when neither by itself would be sufficient to

112. See id. at 21.
113. See Ex parte Crane, C.D. 7 (1869), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 110, at 225
[hereinafter Crane].
114. Id.
115. See id. at226.
116. See id. ("I am unable to perceive any good reasons why designs for utility are not
fairly and properly embraced within the [design patent] statute, as well as those relating to
ornamentation merely."); see also id. at 225 ("The construction which has been given.., by
the office ever since its passage... is that it relates to designs for ornament merely; something
of an artistic character as contradistinguished to those of convenience or utility.").
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justify protection."7
This result was an ideal blueprint for protecting incremental
improvements through a property rule. Functional innovations that
could not get a utility patent (e.g., a fur box) could still receive
protection if they had an ornamental feature that made up for their lack
of functional novelty and nonobviousness. Put another way, the Patent
Office was lowering the threshold for obtaining patents to functional
changes by allowing their esthetic qualities to count towards that
inquiry. Likewise, the opinion reduced the burden for protecting
commercial art because an esthetic item that would not qualify for a
design patent on its own could now do so as long as it had some
functional facet that made up the difference. This expansion of patent
law was part of a deliberate effort by the Commissioner to encourage
marginal innovations. As the conclusion of his opinion stated,
There is a large class of improvements in manufactured articles
that are not regarded as inventions, or as coming within the
scope of general patent laws. They add to the market value and
saleability of such articles, and often result from the exercise of
much labor, genius, and expense. They promote the best
interests of the country, as well as the creations of inventive
talent. It seems to me to have been the intent of Congress to
extend to all such cases a limited protection and
encouragement." 8
In essence, the Commissioner was seeking to move patent law towards
the copyright model that is supported by modern design advocates.
What made Crane particularly useful for protecting incremental
improvements was the vagueness of its new standard. Although almost
every commercial item can be described as a combination of form and
function, there was no indication in the opinion regarding how to
determine which hybrids should qualify for protection."' The lack of
117. Actually, the line of authority spawned by Crane and the subsequent amendment to
the design patent statute went further and held that a functional design with no ornamental
aspect could get design patent protection. See Ex parte Fenno, C.D. 52 (1871), reprinted in
FENTON, supra note 110, at 252. Of course, Crane also explained that reasonable people
could say that any new functional design was also an esthetic improvement. See Crane,supra
note 113, at 226 ("It would be impossible, in the view of such persons, to make any
improvement in utility that did not at the same time add to the ornamental and artistic.").
118. Crane,supra note 113, at 225.
119. To be fair, crafting a clear test was almost impossible. Combining esthetic and
functional creativity into a single standard leads to incoherence because each aspect is
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specificity in this test would allow patent examiners to protect virtually
any marginal innovation by simply claiming that its mix of qualities was
sufficient to warrant granting property rights. Furthermore, without a
clear standard to frame that inquiry, there was almost no way to
challenge a decision giving protection to an improvement.
Against this backdrop, Congress decided to amend the design patent
statute as part of a broader reorganization of the intellectual property
system. In the initial design law enacted in 1842, Congress had
established that a "new and original design" could be patented."'
Following the Crane decision, however, the design patent statute was
revised to read, "any new, useful, and original shape or configuration of
any article of manufacture."121 There are two ways of interpreting this

statutory change. The addition of the word "useful," with its obvious
connotation of functionality, could be construed as congressional
confirmation of Crane's reasoning. 22 On the other hand, this change
could have been purely stylistic. There is no legislative history to
indicate why Congress made the alteration, and it does seem unlikely
that such a major policy shift would have been undertaken without any
discussion at all.
Though the intent of- Congress with respect to the design patent
amendment remains unclear, the ambiguity of the new statutory
language only intensified the debate sparked by Crane. For the next
thirty years, confusion reigned as supporters and opponents of broad
protection for incremental innovations attempted to gain the upper
hand.' 2 The to-and-fro of their arguments hit on many familiar themes
associated with the power and limits of intellectual property. Yet this
was not a mere academic exercise; it involved a lengthy and serious fight
over the future of design law. The most important lesson from that time
is that the people with the most experience with a strong property right
for commercial art eventually concluded that it was a bad idea.
Opponents of design reform struck back quickly, as a new Patent
Commissioner reversed Crane in 1871.'24 In Ex parte Parkinson,he held
measured so differently. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
120. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3,5 Stat. 543.
121. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198 (emphasis added). This statute also
established federal trademark protection for the first time. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
122. Of course, Crane was interpreting the old statutory language. The Patent
Commissioner in that case was either prescient or engaged in serious activism.
123. See infra notes 124-43.
124. See Ex parte Parkinson, C.D. 251 (1871), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 110, at
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that "it is clear to my mind that [my predecessor] opened the door to
design patents far too widely. ' "' Describing the new practice of the
office as "not only liberal but lax," the opinion argued that "[t]he idea of
stretching the [design law] to cover slight changes in the form of crowbars, spades, plows, scrapers, [etc.] is simply ridiculous, and tends to
bring the whole system into disrepute."1 26 As for the recent revision of
the statute by Congress, Parkinsonconcluded that "[t]he term 'useful' in
relation to designs means adaptation to produc[e] pleasant emotions,"
and not improvements in functional utility."7 In other words, "[t]he
Legislature never intended.., to let down the standard for patents. It
was never contemplated to grant a design patent for every possible
change of form that might be given to a machine or article of
manufacture."' 2' Accordingly, the opinion held that a design patent
could be29 granted only if a designer could "produce a new esthetic
effect."'
The Parkinson decision was motivated by the orgy of patent
smuggling that broke out following the Crane ruling. At the end of
Parkinson, the Commissioner painted a memorable portrait of the
patent smugglers that were given free rein by providing incremental
improvements with protection:
In general, such men are imposters, and desire a design patent
merely to obtain the right to put the word "patented" upon their
manufacture, and thereby deceive the public and wrong real
inventors, for they well know that not one person in ten thousand
will ever learn the fact that the patent only covers the design."'
This quotation identifies an important aspect of the smuggling
problem. Not only do broad design rights sweep in functional
innovations that should not get protection, but they also allow the
smugglers to hide their activity at the expense of other inventors who
need to know what is private property and what is in the public domain.
Faced with these tangible costs, opponents of expansive design patent
law concluded that such an expansion was not worthwhile.
257 [hereinafter Parkinson].
125. Id. at 259.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 258.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 259.
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Design advocates refused to roll over and play dead after this
setback, maintaining that the position set forth in Crane was consistent
with the actual practice of the Patent Office and was aligning the law
with reality.' There is some truth in this assertion. After all, hundreds
of patents were granted under the design patent statute even though
that was not in accord with a strict interpretation of the statute.3 2
Moreover, many functional designs with dubious artistic credentials on
objects ranging from axe-heads to propeller blades received design
protection even before Crane was decided.'33 In essence, supporters of
Crane contended that anti-design forces were the ones engaged in policy
activism by ignoring the longstanding custom of the Patent Office.
Spurred by these arguments, in 1879 the tide turned again as another
Patent Commissioner overruled Parkinson in favor of the liberal
standard.'34 Avoiding the policy issues this time, the Commissioner
rested his decision on the congressional amendment to the design patent
law.'35 According to this opinion, "useful" was not a synonym for
"ornamental," and the contrary reading "adopted in Parkinson's
case
cannot fairly be imputed to the word useful in the statute."'36 Unlike the
situation in the prior cases, however, there was now a serious obstacle to
changing course. In 1872 the Supreme Court had stated that "[tihe acts
of Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were
plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts" and said
nothing about functional inventions.'
In response, the Commissioner
simply dismissed this declaration as dictum. 3' Clearly, it would take
more than a Supreme Court decision to resolve this struggle in the world
of patents.
Less than ten years later, the Patent Office flip-flopped yet again and
3'
reinstated Parkinson.'
Displaying a wisdom that his predecessors
lacked, the latest Commissioner cut to the heart of the question by
131. See Ex parte Bartholomew, C.D. 103 (1869), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 110,
at 235 ("[Alrticles have been, and are being constantly, patented as designs which possess no
element of the artistic or ornamental .... ") [hereinafter Bartholomew].
132. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
133. See Bartholomew,supra note 131, at 103.
134. See Ex parte Shoeninger, 15 O.G. 384 (1879), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 110,
at 303 [hereinafter Shoeninger].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511,524 (1872).
138. See Shoeninger,supra note 134, at 301, 303.
139. See Ex parte Schulze-Berge, 42 O.G. 293 (1888), reprinted in FENTON, supra note
110, at 328-29.
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opining that "[i]t is sometimes exceedingly difficult to separate the form
and configuration of a body from its function. This seems to have been
the difficulty in cases hereinbefore cited, where reference has been had
to propeller-blades, plow-shares, and other like instrumentalities."'"
Basically, this reflects the dilemma posed now by the conceptual
separability doctrine in copyright. 41 When the law decides to protect
incremental design improvements, whether the tool of choice is called
"patent" or "copyright," the inquiry focuses on separating form from
function. That task is like undoing the Gordian Knot-it is impossible
to finesse. Just as patent examiners in the Nineteenth Century could not
sensibly distinguish esthetics and utility, neither can modern courts.
Obviously, that issue cannot. be avoided in some hard cases. The
problem with using a property rule for marginal innovations, however, is
that it forces patent examiners and courts to engage in that hopeless
analysis all the time. Like patent smuggling, this was a serious cost that
was recognized by opponents of broad design protection.
Instability in patent law eventually became a major concern, and
Congress was forced to step in and restore order. In 1902, correcting the
confusion that it had (perhaps unintentionally) created in its prior
tinkering with the design patent statute, Congress amended the law
again and deleted the problematic word "useful."14 2 Taking the hint, the
Patent Office subsequently hewed to the stricter interpretation of the
design patent statute that had preceded Crane. More importantly,
patent examiners actually began conforming their practice to that
narrower standard and continue to do so. Seeing that the jig was up,
design advocates soon began their long and hopeless lobbying effort for
a separate bill to protect commercial art.'43
Three conclusions, which all weigh against design property rights,
can be drawn from this history. First, the abstract threat of patent
smuggling turns out to be a real problem under a regime that gives
strong incentives to marginal design innovations. Second, smuggling in
a way that permits broad protection for commercial art is almost
impossible because no reliable test can be devised to distinguish form
and function in commercial art. Third, there is no evidence that the
experiment with a property rule actually led to more or better designs.
Instead, the most serious effort to extend the type of protection desired
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 332.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See SYMONS, supra note 110, at 21.
See Goldenberg, supra note 4, at 27.
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by design advocates led to chaos and was repealed by Congress. These
lessons stand as a somber warning against any new industrial design
statute.
C. A Reality Check
Beyond the doctrinal and historical considerations that undermine
the case for design property rights, there are some practical observations
that also work against that kind of protection. The most important of
these are: (1) the relative lack of alternatives to any particular design;
(2) the low cost of creating designs; and (3) the excellent design climate
in the current marketplace.
Building on the insight that the level of available alternatives should
influence a decision on whether to grant property protection, a
comparison with copyright again suggests that designs should not
receive these rights.'" There are an almost infinite number of ways to
express an abstract idea, such as justice or love, through the purely
esthetic means that are the focus of copyright. Thus, copyright law
rarely denies protection to this kind of incremental improvement
because there is no cost imposed on others by having some of these
expressions owned by private parties. By contrast, there is a finite set of
possible esthetic designs for something like a car or a vacuum cleaner.
That does not mean that the supply of design options is small; it just says
that it is smaller than the alternatives to a typical copyright. In other
words, there is a greater cost imposed on future creators by protecting
marginal improvements in design than there is from protecting
incremental innovations that are purely esthetic. 45 Once again, this
explains why, although appealing, the argument that designs and
copyrights should be given similar protection is unsound.
Another argument against additional protection for commercial art
is that the cost of producing new ornamental designs is so low that
companies will invest in them even without the security of property
rights. While marginal innovations generate small benefits that can be
outweighed by administrative costs, that also means most designs are
cheap to produce. As a practical matter, "[e]ven a design that is merely
different rather than 'better' may have its advantages, because it may
144. See supra Part 1II.D.
145. The validity of protecting incremental improvements that are esthetic while not
protecting ones that are commercial is also supported by doctrinal considerations that
demonstrate the fundamental differences between copyright and designs. See supra Part
III.C.2.
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appeal to a desire for diversity or distinctiveness and aid in marketing by
differentiating the product from its rivals."'46 Creating a design that is
merely different from others takes very little effort. Moreover, designs
generally represent "only a small fraction of total product development
and production costs. With so much at stake, a manufacturer is unlikely
to forego the substantial benefits of a well-designed product merely
because a competitor might gain a marginal saving through design
piracy. ,,147

The prediction that the average company will produce new designs
despite a lack of legal encouragement is supported by everyday
experience. Walk into any major retail outlet and you will find an
astonishing array of product designs from which to choose. This simple
observation raises the question of why more design protection is
necessary, particularly given the costs of applying a property rule in this
context. One possibility is that the current situation may look fine, but
still greater wonders are possible if the law gives more encouragement
to industrial art. To the extent that this speculative assertion can be
assessed, the promise of better designs through property law is not
persuasive. As the previous section explained, 8 the robust protection
of incremental innovations for a time in the Nineteenth Century did not
have a significant impact on the quality of American design. The other
justification for reform would concede that the current supply and
quality of designs is adequate but argue that not enough of them are
domestically produced. That contention, which is essentially an
argument for protectionism, will be addressed in Part VI.
After reviewing all of the pertinent criteria, the best conclusion is
that ornamental designs should not receive property protection. A
doctrinal comparison places commercial art within the ambit of
trademark law, which frowns on using property to stimulate production.
History indicates that any attempt to use property for incremental
design improvements leads to confusion and interferes with the creative
process. Finally, economic considerations also cast doubt upon the
wisdom of adding to the inexorable expansion of intellectual property
rights. Accordingly, a new industrial design statute that extends a
property rule over commercial art should be rejected. The solution to
the design dilemma lies elsewhere.

146. Denicola, supranote 40, at 723.
147. Id. at 723-24.
148. See supra Part IV.B.
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V. POSSESSORY RULES

Although broad property protection for commercial art falls short in
a number of respects, there is another approach that might fare better.
The law could enhance the ability of designers to retain exclusive
possession of their work without granting an entitlement. That formula,
which I have defined as a possessory rule, provides incentives for
creativity while avoiding the problems caused by applying a property
rule. This Part explores how possessory rules work and shows why they
do not quite carry the day for designs.
A. A Haljway House

Possessory rules are a compromise between property rights and
brute force. Everyone knows that possession is at the core of
ownership. Indeed, in a world without law, possession is the only thing
that matters. Property rights modify this state of nature by guaranteeing
possession or compensation for wrongful dispossession. Yet many
entitlements contain exceptions that allow ownership rights to be
terminated for public policy reasons. Two excellent examples of this are
adverse possession for land and fair use in copyright. While these
limited bundles of rights could still be described as property, from
another perspective they simply strengthen the ability of owners to
retain exclusive possession without giving them title against all comers.
As the scope of these limitations increase, the regulation moves away
from traditional property towards another form-a possessory rulewhich can be analyzed as a distinct legal category. Most of the time,
however, nothing is really gained by distinguishing between property
and possessory rules.
Incremental improvements present a unique situation because of the
important concept of "lead time.""'49 Lead time is the period "between
an innovator's unveiling of a new idea and a competitor's successful
duplication of it.""l° Every innovator obtains a temporary monopoly on

that improvement simply by being first. This is true for the first person
to open a fast food restaurant in a town or the first person to put plastic
antlers on hats. By giving innovators a temporary monopoly, lead time
makes it possible for them to recover at least some of their investment
while competitors work to catch up.

149. For a classic discussion of the importance of lead time, see Breyer, supra note 81, at
299-300.
150. Lichtman, supra note 12, at 711.

20031

ORNAMENTAL DESIGN

Lead time was once the primary tool for encouraging marginal
improvements, but changes in technology have seriously drained its
potency. In centuries past, when copying techniques were relatively
primitive, the first mover's lead time advantage was quite significant.
Over time, however, copying has become much easier, causing the lead
time for the average artistic or inventive improvement to diminish
substantially. 5' Indeed, the incremental innovation problem addressed
by this Article can be characterized as a search for an artificial
mechanism to replace a natural nurturing system-lead time-which has
been gravely undermined by advancing technology.'52
While one could argue that the best replacement for lead time is a
property right, a closer look demonstrates that possessory rules are a
better match. After all, lead time is about enhancing possession rather
than property. As a first mover, an innovator retains exclusive
possession until competitors figure out a way to reproduce the
improvement. Once someone else does replicate that innovation,
however, the exclusive rights to the idea disappear. In other words, lead
time does not convey any kind of property entitlement. Thus, property
is not the best substitute for lead time.
By contrast, a possessory rule provides a more precise response for
restoring the traditional lead time advantage by limiting how a
competitor may copy an improvement."3 To determine which copying
techniques should be restricted, the focus should be on channeling
would-be copiers into conducting independent research rather than
allowing them to engage in relatively unproductive activities such as
industrial espionage or copying simpliciter. This encourages innovation
in three ways. First, possessory rules increase lead time by making it
151. This trend may soon turn around. Lawrence Lessig has explained that the
encryption of information into code allows the code's author to exert much greater control
over its dissemination at the expense of would-be copiers. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 128-30 (1999). So far, however, the new technology has
helped copiers more.
152. J.H. Reichman explains the problem a little differently.
He says that the
incremental innovation issue is about the inadequacy of the bipolar model of intellectual
property protection (i.e., patent and copyright) that has ruled the roost since the Nineteenth
Century. See Reichman, supra note 12, at 2500-04. Thus, he suggests that we need a new
model for hybrid forms of property like esthetic designs. See id. at 2501-02. While I agree
with much of Reichman's analysis, his claim that intellectual property was bipolar since the
Nineteenth Century is a little off the mark. In fact, the lines between copyright and patent
were quite fuzzy during that period.
153. See Reichman, supra note 12, at 2440; see also Lichtman, supra note 12, at 719
(stating that these rules "merely restrict the unauthorized use of specific cheap, fast, and
efficient copying technologies.").
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harder for someone's work to be copied. Second, they stimulate
research across an entire industry by forcing "second comers [to]
contribute directly or indirectly to the relevant technical community's
aggregate costs of research and development."154 This is because dealing
with the first mover's enhanced possessory rights requires competitors
to either license the innovation, which helps offset the developer's
Research and Development (R&D) investment directly, or to take the
55
time to conduct their own work that might lead to new breakthroughs.'

By doing no more than simply healing the damage that technology has
inflicted upon lead time, a possessory rule provides stronger incentives
across the board.
The best example of a possessory rule in action is the trade secret
doctrine. That body of law is particularly well-suited for protecting
incremental improvements because it imposes no limit on the substance
of the ideas that can be protected.156 Trade secret, which is almost
entirely

rooted

in

state

law,

protects

confidential

commercial

means."'57

Those wrongful
information against copying by "improper
techniques include theft, wiretapping, breach of contract, bribery, and
fraud. 5 Consistent with the rationale of possessory rules, trade secret
also bars many lawful copying activities that are costly and do not
contribute to R&D.'59 But, this doctrine "does not offer protection
against discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent
invention.., or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with
the known product and working backward to divine the process which
154. Reichman, supra note 12, at 2439.
155. For an interesting analysis of these issues, see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering,111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
156. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Bone, supra note
18, at 248. One could describe trade secret as a combination of property and liability rules. A
liability rule regulates those who acquire trade secrets wrongfully. Yet the original owner of a
trade secret also has the quasi-property right to license that innovation and otherwise enjoy
its fruits until it is reverse-engineered.
In my view, however, calling trade secret a mix of property and liability rules is sloppy.
The "property" right at issue inheres only in the innovator's possession of the item and does
not have any legitimacy apart from that. Thus, describing the status of that ownership as
possessory rather than property is more appropriate. Possessory rules also sweep beyond
trade secret doctrine into situations where the regulation in question cannot reasonably be
classified as a property rule. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 474-76.
158. See id. at 476; Bone, supra note 18, at 250.
159. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476; E.I. Dupont Denemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (declaring the use of an airplane to
photograph a competitor's facility a wrongful practice); Bone, supra note 18, at 250.

20031

ORNAMENTAL DESIGN

aided in its development or manufacture." 60
Another type of possessory rule was before the Supreme Court in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.'61 Bonito Boats, Inc.
concerned Florida's effort to regulate copying methods in the pleasure
boat industry. 2 While esthetic designs for yachts involve a substantial
investment, they are not subject to patent protection because, like other
commercial art, they are rarely deemed to be sufficiently novel or
nonobvious. Moreover, boat designs can be easily copied through a
process called "direct molding," which involves taking a boat and setting
it directly into a mold.'63 To offer some incentives for nautical designers,
the Florida Legislature passed a statute barring the use of direct
molding to copy vessel hulls." As with trade secret law, this possessory
rule restricted a technique of copying simpliciter in order to enhance the
first mover's lead time and force competitors to engage in some research
to reverse-engineer the change. By taking this action, Florida sought to
strike a middle ground between offering no protection and granting boat
designs property rights.'65
Both of these examples illustrate the greater compatibility of
possessory rules with traditional lead time, but another advantage of
these regulations is their ability to avoid the costs involved in turning
incremental innovations into property.'66 First, possessory rules usually
have lower administrative costs than property entitlements. Other than
resolving actions based on violations of the copying prohibitions, a
possessory rule requires no state involvement at all. In particular, the
cumbersome registration and recording system that inevitably
accompanies property rights is not necessary when a possessory rule is
used. Certainly, the enforcement of a possessory rule is not costless and
could still exceed the benefits generated by new innovations.
Nevertheless, possessory rules are more likely to survive this cost160. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476.
161. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
162. See id. at 144; Lichtman, supra note 12, at 697-98.
163. See Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 144; Lichtman, supra note 12, at 697.
164. See Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 144-45; Lichtman, supra note 12, at 697.
165. The Supreme Court struck down this law on preemption grounds. See Bonito
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 168; see also Lichtman, supra note 12, at 719-34 (criticizing the
decision and setting forth an alternative model for evaluating conflicts between state unfair
competition law and patent law). Dismayed by this outcome, Congress decided to give
property rights to boat designers on a trial basis. See Frenkel, supra note 4, at 576-79.
166. See Reichman, supra note 12, at 2507 ("Because these laws operate on quasiliability principles, their delivery of natural lead time occurs without the social costs inherent
in rigid grants of exclusive property rights.").
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benefit analysis than property rules. 67 Second, a possessory rule
eliminates the need to determine the optimal term for a particular
improvement. Instead, the decision is made by market competitors who
assess each new innovation and determine how worthwhile it is to
reverse-engineer. That calculation, in turn, shapes how long the first
mover can retain exclusive possession. While these market predictions
will not all be perfect, on average they will tend to be more accurate
than a one-size-fits-all approach taken by a legislature with far less
information about the competitive environment.
This does not mean that possessory rules are free from trouble. In
particular, maintaining exclusive possession without a legal entitlement
requires the improvement to be kept confidential by the original
innovator. Yet secrecy is costly to the party holding the secret and to
society as a whole. Under a possessory rule, some resources that could
be devoted to new investments will instead go towards protecting
existing secrets. That tendency shows how possessory rules sit
awkwardly between the security of property and the helter-skelter of
unregulated competition. Furthermore, one benefit of having a
registration system for intellectual works (i.e., a property rule) is that
inventors and artists can find out what others have done so they can
In an
learn from that creativity and avoid duplicative effort.
however,
that
environment where most innovations are kept secret,
critical disclosure is simply unavailable.
B. Application to Designs
Having established the potential for possessory rules to act where
property and liability regulations cannot, the inquiry now turns to
whether product designs are a good candidate for possessory protection.
Unfortunately, the answer is disappointing. The problem with applying
a possessory rule in this context is that most product designs can be
copied merely by inspection, which is sometimes described, as "knowhow on its face."'68 As a result, replication by competitors is so easy that
167. Critics of the trade secret doctrine could argue that uncertainty regarding what
constitutes improper copying leads to a great deal of litigation and makes the doctrine quite
costly to administer. In my view, this criterion is overstated because the problem, if there is
one, lies with the lack of clarity in the legal harms upon which trade secret claims frequently
piggybacks. For instance, a breach of contract can lead to a trade secret violation, but the
ambiguities of contract law are often difficult to resolve. That is not trade secret law's fault.
In any event, possessory rules can be crafted to avoid these problems by specifying what
copying methods are not allowed.
168. See Lichtman, supra note 12, at 730 n.90 (citation omitted).
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nothing short of a sweeping prohibition on copying will increase the first
mover's lead time. That kind of policy prescription, however, raises
questions that cannot be resolved without a lot more thought.
When it comes to ornamental designs, there is no way that an
innovator can maintain the confidentiality necessary for a possessory
rule to work because the improvement is right on the product for all to
see. If firms want to copy the latest fashion trend or sleek computer
design, all they need to do is buy an original, inspect it, and make
something that looks the same. In other words, it is extremely easy to
duplicate most esthetic designs. Moreover, unlike the situation with a
yacht hull, there is no single copying technique for ordinary commercial
art that is significantly faster than another.'69 Thus, barring some
copying methods and not others will not have a significant impact on
lead time.
The only way out of this conundrum is to expand the possessory rule
concept from prohibiting certain copying techniques to barring certain
parties from copying designs altogether. This straddles the boundary
between a property entitlement and an ordinary possessory rule because
it would give an innovator exclusive rights against certain parties but
only enhance possession against others. In a design context, such an
approach flows from a premise that most design piracy comes from
knockoff firms that do nothing but copy work from established firms.
Assuming that this is true, a possessory rule could identify those
outsiders and bar them from copying, and at the same time allow
reputable companies that contribute in some meaningful way to esthetic
research to continue copying freely. As a result, lead time would be
extended and design pirates would be forced to license innovations or
start doing their own work.
This approach is not novel-it is the essence of a guild. Traditional
guilds, which were backed by state law, allowed only certain producers
to participate in a given enterprise and share in each other's work.70
The Supreme Court once described the Fashion Guild this way:
[A]lthough they admit that their "original creations" are neither
169. After all, the premise of the statute addressed in Bonito Boats was that copying by
direct molding was substantially easier than through other means, perhaps because pleasure
boats are relatively large and complex objects that take considerable time to copy by
inspection.
170. Of course, many guilds did not even allow members to copy from each other. In
that case, the guild was essentially giving members a property right to their work, with all of
the problems that come with that type of entitlement.
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copyrighted nor patented.., they nevertheless urge that sale of
copied designs constitutes an unfair trade practice and a tortious
invasion of their rights. Because of these alleged wrongs,
petitioners ... combined among themselves to combat and, if

possible, destroy all competition from the sale of garments which
are copies ....
To the extent that a guild was either created or tolerated by the state,
therefore, one could describe that arrangement as an enhanced
possessory rule that swept more broadly than trade secret law or a
restriction on specific copying practices.
This breadth, on the other hand, also suggests why lawmakers should
be skeptical of this proposal. In the above-quoted Supreme Court case,
the Justices held that the Fashion Guild violated the antitrust laws by
engaging in a number of anti-competitive activities besides merely
policing design pirates." Once the law gives some firms a special
competitive advantage (i.e., the ability to copy designs when others
cannot), all of the negative economic effects of oligopoly will start
rearing their ugly heads. Those costs must be weighed against the
benefits of increased design protection, but keep in mind that these
same costs were deemed prohibitive in the past when the guilds were
abolished. Furthermore, this expansion of the possessory concept rests
on the questionable assumption that design piracy is the product of a
few bad apples. The opposite premise is equally valid-that all firms in
an industry engage in design copying in roughly the same degree. In
that case an expanded possessory regulation would fail because there
would be no sensible way to distinguish between companies that should
and should not be allowed to copy designs.
Accordingly, a possessory rule has many advantages for protecting
incremental improvements, but these advantages probably come to
naught with respect to commercial art. If there was empirical data that
showed a high concentration of design piracy among a few renegade
firms, then a broader formulation akin to a guild could be tried as an
experiment. It is doubtful, however, that this would be worthwhile
given the distortions that it would create in the marketplace.
VI. A TRADING SOLUTION
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the answer to the design
171. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,461 (1941).
172. See id. at 463.
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dilemma cannot be found in legal rules. This Part explains how the
United States maintains an adequate supply of commercial art by
running a design trade deficit. That economic reality is not lost on
design reform advocates. Indeed, their most consistent argument over
the years has been that a new industrial design statute is needed to
protect domestic designers from foreign competition. After briefly
weighing the competing arguments, the analysis rejects this plea for
protectionism and extols the virtues of free trade in designs.
A. Protectionism:The Last Resort

Reliance on trade to square the design circle was hinted at earlier
and becomes apparent when two simple facts are put together.'73 First,
consumers have an amazing variety of product designs from which to
choose. Second, this cornucopia exists even though domestic law
provides very limited protection for designers. These conflicting
observations make sense if imports are accounting for the difference
between what the law can encourage and what is actually available in
the marketplace. Yet this line of thought leaves an important question
unanswered. If the United States imports many of its designs from
abroad, this suggests that other countries must have stronger legal
protection for designs. But if these design-exporting countries can
establish broad property rights for commercial art, then why is that
policy wrong for us?
The answer is that many countries have stronger protection for
designers because they start from a different premise regarding
intellectual property rights.'74 In the Anglo-American tradition,
intellectual property is justified by utilitarianism.'75 Article One, Section
Eight of the United States Constitution states that copyrights and
patents can be granted by Congress only for the purpose of
173. See supra Part IV.C.
174. This is illustrated by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs), which was signed as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT and
requires participating countries to provide broad design rights. See Frenkel, supra note 4, at
533 n.18. The United States maintains that its patchwork of design protection meets this
standard, though that assertion is implausible. See id. at 533.
175. However, this rationale is starting to erode in a manner that may have serious
consequences. Intellectual property rights are increasingly being viewed as an expression of
individual autonomy that may be granted even when there is no utilitarian basis for doing so.
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1989) (articulating the utilitarian
rationale). That slow transformation in the foundation of these rights is not yet significant
enough to say that our law has rejected utilitarianism and embraced the concept of moral
rights. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. But that day may be approaching.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[86:845

"promot[ing] the progress of Science and useful Arts."'76 Artists and
inventors do not receive property rights merely because their work
expresses their individuality. Their work receives protection only if it is
deemed socially valuable in some sense.
By contrast, many countries view intellectual property as a privacy
right that recognizes "the intimate bond which exists between a literary
or artistic work and its author's personality" and tips the balance heavily
in the creator's favor.' Under this framework of "moral rights," artists
retain a degree of control over their work even after they sell it.'78 For
instance, French and German laws recognize "rights of integrity," which
permits innovators to prevent a change to their work that undermines
their "intellectual interests, personal style, or literary, artistic or
scientific conceptions."'79 In societies that embrace moral rights, the
cost-benefit analysis for protecting commercial art is quite different than
what our utilitarian approach would tolerate.'8 Basically, the moralrights countries are more willing to accept the costs of extending broad
property rights to product designs or other intellectual property in
exchange for allowing more individual expression for its own sake.
Thus, other countries can easily endorse a property rule for designs
while the United States can just as confidently deny such rights.
Naturally, using imports to fill the shelves with product designs
avoids many of the troubling issues that are the handmaidens of
providing commercial artists with incentives through legal rules. No
significant administrative costs are involved-the state just has to get
out of the way and let market forces have free rein. There is also no
possibility of erring in the calculation of an optimal term for designs. Of
course, countries that choose to use property rules as a means of
regulating commercial art do incur these costs. An import strategy
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
177. Brian T. McCartney, "Creepings"and "Glimmers" of the Moral Rights of Artists in
American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35, 36 (1998). The closest analog to this
approach in American law is the right of publicity, which gives a person exclusive control over
the commercial use of their persona. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831, 834-37 (6th Cir. 1983). In attempting to explain the breadth of this right, which
sweeps well beyond any credible utilitarian rationale, some commentators have invoked the
right of privacy in lieu of a standard intellectual property theory. See, e.g., William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,389 (1960).
178. In effect, moral rights act as restrictive covenants on an intellectual property
instrument.
179. McCartney, supra note 177, at 38 (citation omitted).
180. See id. at 36 ("The moral right can be distinguished from traditional property rights
in that it purports to protect the personal rights of creative artists, as distinguished from their
merely economic rights.").
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simply allows the United States to free ride on the expensive policy
choices of others.
Design advocates, however, have never been happy about this
situation and complain that not enough commercial art is produced
domestically. Indeed, this is the only argument for design reform that
might make some sense. Since there are plenty of inexpensive and highquality esthetic designs available, the claim that consumers would
benefit from additional design rights rings hollow. Using reform to help
domestic designers at the expense of domestic consumers and foreign
designers provides a more logical rationale. Richard Gephardt, the
former Democratic leader in the House of Representatives, once
explained that design protection is a good idea because protecting
domestic industries is more important than providing low prices for
consumers.'
Not surprisingly, opponents of free trade have pursued
design reform for decades because it is "seen as a way to protect
American industry without raising trade barriers or other tariffs." 8 2 Put
another way, broad design rights serve as a stalking horse for
protectionism.
In fact, protectionism has been a major theme behind almost every
proposal for a new industrial design law since the design patent statute
was rolled back in 1902.83 When Congress considered one of the first
reform bills in 1914, design advocates "argued that protection would
create an American design industry, and that lack of protection would
further the then current practice of importing all quality designs and
designers from abroad.'" Fast-forward to 1980, and one finds design
supporters still arguing unsuccessfully that design protection was "as a
matter of competitive survival in a cutthroat and international
marketplace.""' In congressional testimony for reform legislation, a
parade of witnesses lamented the decline of traditional industries such
as shoes, cars, and consumer electronics and claimed that cheap
imported designs were the problem.
A few years ago, no less of an
authority than Ralph S. Brown described the 1987 design reform

181. Goldenberg, supra note 4, at 59.
182. Id. at 58. Of course, design protection is a type of trade barrier, but the point is that
it does not look like one.
183. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
184. Goldenberg, supra note 4, at 28 (citing congressional testimony of Zell G. Roe,
patent attorney representing the Lighting and Fixtures trade).
185. Id. at 51.
186. See id. at 51-52 (citing congressional testimony of David Levy, Executive Dean,
Parsons School of Design).
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proposal as "a bald piece of protectionism" that was targeting Japanese
products. 7 Since supporters of new rights for commercial art make
their last stand on protectionist grounds, that argument must be
evaluated before ending this analysis.
B. Consideringan IndustrialPolicy for Designs
Let us now look at the merits of this final rationale for extending a
broad property rule over industrial designs.
Although some
protectionists use the design issue simply to further their broader
agenda, the argument may have independent merit. After all, there are
some situations in which excessive reliance on imported intellectual
property can pose a problem. Esthetic designs, however, are far
removed from these exceptions to the principle of free trade.
Though the United States once pursued protectionist policies, our
current approach usually pursues free trade. That longstanding policy
stems from the well-known arguments against protectionism. Briefly,
tariffs and other trade barriers are a tax on imports that raise their price.
By impeding foreign competition in this manner, domestic producers
gain an artificial competitive advantage even though they may produce
the same goods less efficiently or at a lower level of quality. This
distortion in the marketplace creates three significant problems. First,
tariffs diminish consumer welfare because they force people to pay more
than is necessary for goods from protected industries. Second, trade
barriers divert resources from successful industries into ones that can
survive only with government help. Third, protectionism can lead to
retaliation by foreign rivals, which may hurt American firms that
depend on exports.
Nevertheless, there are three exceptions to this presumption of an
open economy that can justify protectionism and that might apply to
ornamental designs. To begin with, national security is sometimes a
strong argument for exclusionary trade policies."' For instance, a
society might be concerned about its heavy reliance on imported utility
patents because technical know-how is an essential component of an
effective military. As a result, a government might make special (and

costly) efforts to encourage and maintain a reservoir of domestic

187. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1399.
188. See, e.g., Randall D. Lehner, Protectionism, Prestige, and National Security: The
Alliance Against Multilateral Trade in InternationalAir Transport, 45 DUKE L.J. 436, 448-51
(1995) (setting forth the national security arguments made for protecting the airline and steel
industries).
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inventors and technology in case a war cuts off foreign supplies.
Obviously, commercial art does not fall under this exception to free
trade principles.
Next, protectionism is often used as a tool for encouraging a unique
national culture. Think about why France subsidizes its film industry or
why numerous nations, including the United States, do so much to
protect their farmers even though agriculture is not a cutting-edge
industry. While these protectionist measures may just be the result of
special interest groups flexing their muscles, another explanation is that
certain fields are deemed to be such an integral part of a nation's
identity that they must be preserved through trade barriers.
Ornamental designs, however, do not pass muster under this rationale.
Though products can become cultural icons, incremental design
improvements-as distinct from designs that already qualify for design
patents-are hardly candidates for these kinds of cultural
breakthroughs.
Finally, in some instances there are positive externalities from
having a particular domestic industry that may outweigh the costs that
trade barriers impose. For instance, encouraging technological research
or cultural achievement may promote the development of institutions of
higher learning that can provide significant benefits by elevating the
quality of education generally. Moreover, high-tech or high-culture
industries tend to be the breeding ground for major advances in
intellectual creativity, and therefore encouraging those industries might
generate productivity benefits that outweigh the costs of trade
barriers."9 Designs do not come close to providing these kinds of
externalities. In particular, the areas where commercial art is important
usually involve low-margin consumer goods such as textiles that do not
generate any incidental benefits that outweigh the costs that trade
barriers impose. Indeed, protecting these kinds of enterprises actually
reduces the potential for new externalities by shifting resources away
from the high-tech sectors that are more likely to create the benefits that
protectionists want. Thus, an externality theory just does not work for
designs.
In sum, none of the exceptions to free trade can justify a new
industrial design statute. If the United States can run a trade deficit
with respect to strategic resources like oil and capital (i.e., the current
account deficit), then it can certainly run a deficit with respect to
189. This does not mean that a protectionist rationale leads to the conclusion that
copyrights and patents need more protection than they get now.
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ornamental designs. Indeed, trade in commercial art is a fine example
of the benefits yielded by an open international economy where
societies can take advantage of their different resources and legal
arrangements to make mutually beneficial exchanges. New domestic
regulations for designs will only disrupt this harmonious balance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ornamental designs enrich our lives every day. Many of Edison's
inventions did not have as great an impact on society as the Tiffany
lamp or the Air Jordan sneaker. While there is a tendency to trivialize
designers because their work is more commercial than esthetic, neither
snobbishness nor the selfishness of certain interest groups justifies the
lack of protection given to most commercial art. The reluctance of
Congress to grant product designs a broad property right is instead
based on a sound belief that encouraging incremental improvements
presents enormous complexities. Moreover, an array of specific
points-particularly the illustrative but oft-ignored experience with
broad design rights in the Nineteenth Century-establish that marginal
design innovations do not deserve property protection.
This recognition is the beginning of wisdom in two respects. First, it
opens the door to using possessory rules as an alternative method of
regulation for various resources. Though that legal form is not
appropriate for esthetic designs, possessory rules should be considered
alongside liability and property rules when legislators want to provide
incentives to stimulate incremental innovations without imposing
massive costs. Second, understanding the economics of incremental
improvements illustrates how international trade interacts with legal
doctrine. In the end, while beauty is in the eye of the beholder, the law
just does not have the vision to encourage beautiful product designs.

